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Paul Ricoeur’s fastidiousness about separating his philosophical
reflection from his religious reflection is well-known.1 Even in his
religious writing, he was reluctant to engage in systematic theology,
preferring biblical commentary and philosophy of  religion. Despite
this distanciation from systematic theology, his work has impacted it
and has striking implications for it. Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy
is based on the root metaphor of  interpreting texts, in the end indicating
that human beings themselves are hermeneutical beings. Even as he
drew on others such as Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer
in his development of  ontological hermeneutics,2 his own rich
phenomenological account of  the dynamics of  interpretation became
a “critical hermeneutics” as a basis for a broad philosophy that covers
epistemology, anthropology, and to some extent metaphysics.3 As it
attempts to avoid the false dilemma of  objectivism and relativism so
characteristic of  modernity, as Richard Bernstein has pointed out,4 his
philosophy represents one of  the more significant types of  postmodern
philosophy. As theology has itself  floundered in the wake of  modernity,
a philosophy like Ricoeur’s in which hermeneutics is so central, as it is
in theology, shows great promise as a resource for reframing or
reconfiguring theology as it seeks to relocate its moorings.
In an earlier book, Theology after Ricoeur: New Directions in
Postmodern Theology, I sought to provide a basis for this claim.5 In that
book, I attempted to show how, despite Ricoeur’s notoriously
meandering pathway through an astonishing variety of  areas in
philosophy without clear signals for how to tie things together, his later
work, particularly Oneself  as Another, enabled one to discern an
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impressively comprehensive and coherent philosophy. I also argued
that his hermeneutical philosophy, while not always recognized as
postmodern as such, represents one of  the more viable attempts to do
philosophy after modernity. In fact, Ricoeur’s work participated in
undermining the modernist paradigm even as it has pointed beyond it.
In a variety of  ways, Ricoeur’s work has affinities with theological issues,
to name a few, sin, evil, the nature of  the self, epistemology, and figurative
language. His idea of  a hermeneutical arc particularly provides a model
for rethinking the nature of  systematic theology in the light of  the
postmodern paradigm change. This essay focuses some of  those ideas
in light of  Ricoeur’s further work and recent developments in theology.
Just as philosophy has been dramatically reshaped in the
aftermath of  the “wounded cogito”, so has theology.6 Theology itself
was deeply affected by the assumptions of  modernity, manifesting its
own type of  foundationalism and craving for certainty.7 In many ways,
such tendencies had a deforming effect upon theology. In other words,
modernity provided, as it were, cramped confines for theology. As
Hans Frei early indicated, obsession with verifiable facts resulted in the
“eclipse of  the biblical narrative” across the board, across the liberal to
the conservative theological spectrum—just in different ways.8 The
resulting “shattered spectrum” of  theology in the postwar years of  the
twentieth century has left theology trying to find its footing.9
 Even though Ricoeur was reticent about his own theological
influences in philosophy, it is clear at this point that Ricoeur’s philosophy
is at least “friendly” to Christian theology; in his own words, it provides
an “approximation” to theological reflection.10 Moreover, his own late
remarks reveal some change of  mind about the clear demarcation that
he sought, which in many ways was more of  a remnant of  modernity
in his thought and is inconsistent with his more postmodern critique
of  unfettered and unsituated reason. This separation was likely related
to his context in France where he had to fight to overcome a tendency
to see his Christian commitments as undermining his reputation as a
philosopher. As he puts it, however, in a later interview, “I no longer
find such conceptual asceticism tenable.”11
I will first therefore delineate how Ricoeur’s hermeneutical
arc provides a model for estimating systematic theology neither too
highly nor too lowly; how Ricoeur’s development of  the ideas of
testimony and attestation become a basis for theological thinking; and
then how Ricoeur’s work on narrative and metaphor allows one to
conceive of theology in a more natural way in its relationship to its sources.
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Ricoeur’s Hermeneutical Arc and Systematic Theology
Ricoeur’s hermeneutical arc, which he emphasized in the
seventies, began with a first or naïve understanding, moved to critical
explanation, and yielded a post-critical naiveté or appropriation.12 In
actuality, the arc might be better envisaged as a hermeneutical spiral
because the second understanding can lead to further explanation and
yet further appropriation.
Each of  the three terms is laden with philosophical and
theological import. First, beginning with naiveté already questions
Enlightenment foundationalism, which argues in Cartesian style for
beginning only with tightly secured foundations, whether they be
indubitable beliefs as in rationalism or incorrigible sense data as in
empiricism. Theology attempted to find its own style of  foundations
in unquestionable religious experience as in liberalism or in inerrant
Scripture as in fundamentalism. Ricoeur, conversely, reveals his
postmodern move by pointing out that we always begin reflection too
late:
In contrast to philosophies concerned with starting points,
a meditation on symbols starts from the fullness of
language and of  meaning already there; it begins from
within language which has already taken place and in which
everything in a certain sense has already been said; it wants
to be thought, not presuppositionless, but in and with all
its presuppositions. Its first problem is not how to get
started but, from the midst of  speech, to recollect itself.13
His philosophy is thus a reflective, postmodern philosophy that sees
both experience and Scripture as already interpreted.14 To draw on
perhaps the other most significant hermeneutical philosopher who
heralds the end of  modernity, Hans Georg-Gadamer, it is as if  we are
in a game, and we are not so much in control of  playing the game but
are being played.15 Ricoeur’s hermeneutical arc thus fits the Augustinian
approach of  faith seeking understanding but sharpens it in several ways.
Ricoeur felt that the move to explanation could not be avoided
in the contemporary age, although this avoidance has been attempted
by fundamentalists. Apart from them, however, the greater problem as
Ricoeur has noted, even for theologians, has been to become stuck in
the “desert of  criticism” and not to find a way beyond it.16 In modern
theology, for both conservatives and liberals, there has been a tendency
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to make systematic theology the acme of  the reflective task. Although
theology has drawn on religious experience and Scripture, it has
sometimes seen those as pointing to a system that exhaustively
represents them. In linguistic terms, it is the religious parallel to the
philosopher who assumes a substitutionist understanding of  metaphor,
where the metaphor is translated into literal language without remainder.
Ricoeur’s own seminal work on metaphor rejected the substitutionist
approach and proposed an interactionist approach that recognized the
irreducible character of  creative or “living” metaphor.17 As he put it in
his early work, The Symbolism of  Evil, “the symbol gives rise to thought,”
but he made it clear that thought does not exhaust the symbol.18 In
fact, it was in this work that he emphasized the third point of  his
hermeneutical arc as a “post-critical naiveté” that returns to a holistic
“understanding” going beyond “explanation,” yet aided and abetted
by “explanation.”19 In terms of  Ricoeur’s hermeneutical arc, systematic
theology fits into the explanatory dimension. In this postmodern sense,
systematic reflection is a crucial aspect of  theology, but it is neither the
beginning nor the end—despite the pretension to be both at times.
With the hermeneutical arc as a heuristic framework for
“placing” systematic theology, it points to a postmodern approach that
recognizes the poverty of  the foundationalist metaphor and values the
rich sources of  experiences and texts. It also similarly rejects the drive
for obsessive clarity and certainty that would see in a univocal systematic
explanation an exhaustive account of  those experiences and texts, rather
than appreciating their “ontological vehemence” as a fecund source of
recurring inspiration and insight.20 The value of  systematic theology in
a postmodern context then is not as an end to the process but as a
stage along the way to a richer, post-critical naiveté, an appropriation
that is nevertheless deepened by the pathway through critical, systematic
reflection. Systematic theology has thus a significant place but a
supportive and not dominative one.
Attestation and Systematic Theology
One can further enhance the understanding of  the third
moment in the hermeneutical arc by drawing on the way Ricoeur richly
developed the notion of  testimony and attestation in his later work.
Ricoeur identified existential and religious affirmation with a
“hermeneutics of  testimony” in the seventies.21 This pointed to the
way in which testimony can be critically appraised in a kind of  trial of
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faith but whose existential singularity cannot ultimately be replaced. In
Oneself  as Another, published in the nineties, which is as close to a magnum
opus as Ricoeur ever wrote, Ricoeur emphasized that existential
understanding of  the self  is a kind of  “attestation,” and like Aristotle’s
practical wisdom, or phronesis, it cannot be replaced by a set of  ethical
rules. Rather, it is a holistic insight and affirmation that “can claim to
hold itself  at an equal distance from the cogito exalted by Descartes and
from the cogito that Nietzsche proclaimed forfeit.”22 This kind of
“phronetic thinking” that transcends explicit verification or proof, yet
is not a fideistic rejection of  critique, is a helpful way to understand the
nature of  faith affirmations.23 It points to the way that faith cannot be
rationally explicated in a Cartesian sense but is also not wholly exempt
from critique and understanding. To use the title of  a later book of
interviews with Ricoeur, it can be at best a constructive connection
between “critique and conviction.”24
Despite Ricoeur’s own earlier attempts sharply to distinguish
philosophy and theology, his own work undermines such a sharp
demarcation. One might assume from some of his writings that his
epistemological reflections relate to philosophy but not to faith and
theology. It is clear, however, that his reflection on testimony, which
pertains to manifestations of  the Absolute in history as well as to
interpretation and a hermeneutics of  the self, are similar. They are all
situated between empirical verification and fideism.25 Theology’s roots
in existential sources and critical explication of them are not wholly
different from philosophy’s drawing on symbols that give rise to thought
that never wholly transcends such sources. Against a kind of  relativism,
Ricoeur insists that “the absolute declares itself  here and now.”26
Otherwise, “a hermeneutics without testimony is condemned to an
infinite regress in a perspectivism with neither beginning nor end.”27
At the same time, any manifestation of  reality must be interpreted,
which leads to the “conflict of  interpretations,” the name of  one of
Ricoeur’s most significant collection of  writings.28 This makes such
claims a matter of  a “wager,” not a wager that is a leap in the dark but
one that has passed through the fires of  criticism. In his Lectures on
Ideology and Utopia, Ricoeur concedes that this might sound like fideism,
but he denies the appellation.29 Still, he says, “We wager on a certain set
of  values and then try to be consistent with them; verification is therefore
a question of  our whole life. No one can escape this.” Such attestation
that is applicable to major reality claims in both philosophy and theology
reconfigures the age-old debate between faith and reason, showing
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that theological reason cannot operate without the symbols given by
faith, and faith cannot be validated without rational testing—pointing
us back, once again, to the interplay in the hermeneutical arc between
understanding and explanation. In this sense, the rationality of
philosophy and theology appear remarkably similar—not separate poles
as they often have been seen.30
The Figurative and Systematic Theology
Ricoeur, of  course, did groundbreaking work in the areas of
symbol, metaphor, and narrative.31 These might be grouped under his
later terminology of  figuration or mimesis. While Ricoeur led the way
in fresh appreciation of  the cognitive significance of  the figurative
over against a tendency to depreciate it in modern philosophy, he also
tended to see philosophy as striving to minimize its presence in
philosophy per se. Theology also has striven to overcome the figurative
in order to be systematic. With Ricoeur’s help, we can see, however,
how the figurative is deeply enmeshed even in systematic thinking,
allowing for a genuinely narrative theology or metaphorical theology.32
First, Ricoeur’s work on metaphor underscores the irreducible
and creative power of  metaphor. For him, it funds prosaic thought
more than the other way around, which is the more traditional
assumption. In other words, the dominant traditional view was that
the metaphorical is parasitic upon the univocal. In order for metaphors
to be understood, they had to be translated or explained in literal
language. In theological language, the idea is that the figurative in
Scripture and tradition needed to be explained or exegeted in prosaic
language. Ricoeur conversely argues that the semantic shock in the
metaphor leads to a semantic innovation that is not fully translatable
into literal language.33 Metaphors may be the inspiration for
philosophical or theological thought, but their surplus of  meaning
cannot be fully dispersed into literal language.
Second, what Ricoeur’s conception of  metaphor does not
develop is the way that even conceptual thought is interlaced with
metaphor. Metaphor not only funds conceptuality, it can structure it.
This has perhaps been most strikingly illustrated in the philosophy of
science where scientific paradigms are often deeply configured by basic
metaphorical models.34 Ricoeur himself  suggests the notion of  “root
metaphors” that structure understanding in a more basic way.35 What
is more widely seen is the way that more conceptual thought such as
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philosophy and systematic theology, even more than science, are
interlaced with root metaphors. One of  Ricoeur’s former students,
Mark Johnson, along with George Lakoff, has elaborated this idea to
indicate how everyday language itself  is shot through with metaphor
and is hardly comprehensible without it.36
This means, thirdly, that one cannot so neatly separate the
first moment of  understanding in the hermeneutical arc as figurative
from explanation as univocal, nor should one attempt to do so. The
upshot for theology is that one can notice how deeply systematic
theology’s conceptuality itself  is shaped by root metaphors. An obvious
example is the way in which various atonement theories are shaped by
basic metaphors such as ransom, offended honor, legal retribution,
and estranged relationships. Ricoeur himself  masterfully spelled out
the basis of  sin and fault in his earlier phenomenological study, The
Symbolism of Evil, in basic experiences of stain and defilement.37
Understanding the dynamics of  metaphor is crucial then to grasping
the nature even of  historical theology, not to mention further
development of  constructive theology.
In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur actually locates these other
symbols in the master story (which one might consider also as a
metaphor or symbol) of  Adam and Eve in Genesis 3.38 Despite his
own theological reticence and his placement of  the book in the area of
phenomenology or philosophy of  religion, even this early explication
of  that story was an erudite example of  theological reflection. As
Ricoeur emphasizes, the actual rupture of  sin or fault cannot be captured
by essential or pure phenomenological description. His conclusion that
one must unavoidably have recourse to figurative language to capture
such mysterious, inexplicable experiences led him to one of  his grand
detours through figurative language: symbol (The Symbolism of  Evil, Freud
and Philosophy), metaphor (The Rule of  Metaphor), and narrative (Time and
Narrative, 3 vols.; Oneself  as Another). Nevertheless, he does not leave
the experience wholly inexpressible, as a kind of  via negativa, but he
portrays in a helpful way the dynamics involved through an artful
combination of  story and symbol (as in Adam and Eve in the Garden)
with logical if  not systematic explanation. Systematic theology can hardly
do better!
This mixed discourse is akin to Ricoeur’s recourse to the term
“diagnostic” that he used in his first major work, Freedom and Nature,
for the mixed discourse between a phenomenology of  human
experience and a more scientific or physiological account.39 Conceptual
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reflection shaped by mimetic language in this way is closer to the reality
of  theological language. Systematic theology is therefore not so
systematic that it leaves behind its figurative roots. Not only is it indebted
to testimonial resources in experiences of the sacred and of sacred
scripture, even in its explication it draws on the enlivening, and
configuring, power of  “living metaphor” and narrative. Even then, it
points beyond itself  to a post-critical appropriation that may well be an
enriched return to original symbols, metaphors, and narratives that
generated it at the outset.
Ricoeur’s philosophy has contributed much to religious
reflection, whether it be his work on symbolic language or his extended
reflections on anthropology. What I have suggested is that his
hermeneutical philosophy has a close kinship to the nature of  theological
reflection. Drawing on the root metaphor of  a phenomenology of
interpretation, as elaborated in his hermeneutical arc, he offers several
benefits to systematic theology, which has floundered along with
philosophy in the midst of  the fall of  the modern paradigm. Ricoeur
offers a genuinely postmodern way to approach theology by leaving
behind the craving for foundation and certainty. His hermeneutical arc
suggests that theology can be positioned as an explanatory resource
for religious reflection that both calls for it and chastens it. His
elaboration of  figurative language attunes theologians to the way
“symbol gives rise to thought” in theology and continues to shape it.
Finally, his account of  “phronetic thinking” provides a way to
understand how theology can attest to and even clarify sacred mystery
without eliminating it.
In between tendencies to conceive of  theology, on the one
hand, as the precise and complete exposition of Christian belief and,
on the other hand, to despair over theology’s incapacity to name God
at all, Ricoeur’s consistent attempt to find a middle way in philosophy
between Descartes and Nietsche offers an Ariadne’s thread for theology
as well. As he describes the mysterious intersection between philosophy
and theology, prose and poetry, “Beyond the desert of  criticism, we
wish to be called again. But what the symbol gives rise to is thinking.”40
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